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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Steven Douglas McBride, timely appeals from the district court's judgment of
conviction, wherein the district court adjudged Mr. McBride guilty of possession of a
controlled substance.

Prior to the entry of judgment, Mr. McBride filed a motion to

suppress evidence and argued that the impoundment of his vehicle was an illegal
seizure. Additionally, he argued that the ensuing inventory search of his vehicle was
illegal. In denying his suppression motion, the district court found that both the seizure
and search of his vehicle were justified under the inventory exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement. Mr. McBride then entered a conditional guilty plea,
reserving his right to appeal the suppression issues.
On appeal, Mr. McBride asserts that the district court erred in denying his
suppression motion. Specifically, he argues that the impoundment of his vehicle was an
unlawful seizure because the local police department's impoundment policy provides
officer's unfettered discretion when determining which vehicles will be impounded. He
also contends that the "inventory" search of his vehicle was unlawful because there is
no department policy which governs an inventory search.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. McBride was driving Melissa Watson in his mother's car when he was
pulled over by Police Officer Miller, who was investigating a domestic dispute. 1
(02/12/10 Tr., p.14, Ls.8-15; 02/12/10 Tr., p.15, L.6 - p.16, L.11; 06/01/10 Tr., p.11,
L.19-p.12, L.15; 06/01/10 Tr., p.6, L.11 -p.7, L.10.) At the time Mr. McBride's vehicle

1

For the purposes of this brief, the car will be referred to as Mr. McBride's vehicle.
1

was pulled over, it was located on an onramp to an interstate highway.

(02/12/10

Tr., p .12, Ls. 1-6.)
Officer Miller had Mr. McBride exit the vehicle to discuss the alleged domestic
dispute. (06/01/10Tr., p.6, L.17

p.7, L.10; 02/12/10Tr., p.22, Ls.10-17.) Officer Miller

first spoke with Ms. Watson and then spoke with Mr. McBride. (06/12/10 Tr., p.7, L.8 p.9, L.20.)

During this conversation, Officer Miller thought Mr. McBride was acting

unusual and suspected he was under the influence of a controlled substance. (02/12/10
Tr., p.16, Ls.16-23; 06/01/10 Tr., p.9, L.16 - p.10, L.6.) Mr. McBride was eventually
taken into police custody for driving under the influence of a controlled substance.
(06/01/10Tr., p.10, L.18-p11, L.6; 02/12/10Tr., p.17, Ls.12-13.)
After placing Mr. McBride under arrest, Officer Miller called Mr. McBride's
mother.

(06/01/10 Tr., p.11, Ls.19-21.)

During that conversation, Officer Miller

discovered that she owned the vehicle and he then asked Mr. Miller's mother for
permission to search the vehicle because he thought it contained drugs.
Tr., p.11, L.22 - p.12, L.5.)

(06/01/10

Mr. McBride's mother told the officer he could not search

the vehicle. (06/01/10 Tr., p.12, Ls.21-23.) She also told Officer Miller that she did not
want the vehicle impounded because he might find drugs and she could not afford
impound fees. (06/01/11 Tr., p.12, L.16 - p.13, L.1.) She also told Officer Miller that
she could be there to pick up the vehicle in approximately one-half hour.

(06/01/10

Tr., p.26, Ls.3-16.)
Officer Miller then decided to have the vehicle impounded. (06/01/10 Tr., p.11,
Ls.1 - p.18.) Before the vehicle was impounded, he performed an "inventory" search.
(02/12/10 Tr., p.17, Ls.14-20.)

During this search, Officer Miller located a purse,

opened the purse, and found several syringes. (02/12/10 Tr., p.17, L.24 - p.18, L.11.)

2

He also found a stuffed animal with a zipper on its backside. (02/12/10 Tr., p.18, Ls.312.) Officer Miller then unzipped the backside of the stuffed animal and found syringes.
(02/12/10 Tr., p.18, Ls.11-14.)
The prosecutor charged Mr. McBride, by information, with two counts of
possession of a controlled substance, driving under the influence of a controlled
substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and a habitual offender enhancement.
(R., Vol. I, pp.39-40, 116-118.)2 Mr. McBride filed a motion to suppress. (R., Vol. I.,
pp.3535-36, 43-50.)

A suppression hearing was held and the State introduced, as

Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, a copy of the Kootenai County's lmpoundment policy, which is
entitled Special Order #90A. (06/01/10 Tr., p.13, L.13 - p.14, L.10.) At the conclusion
of that hearing, the district court allowed the parties to file supplemental briefing to
address issues which were not included in the original suppression motion. (06/01/10
Tr., p.30, L.22 - p.33, L.22.)
Mr. McBride then filed a supplemental memorandum in support of his motion to
suppress, wherein he argued that the Kootenai County's impoundment policy was
unreasonable, as it provides police officers with unfettered discretion to decide whether
to have a vehicle impounded.

(R., Vol. 11., pp.11-24.)

The Kootenai County

impoundment policy entitled Special Order #90A follows:
It is the policy of the Operations Bureau to tow a vehicle whenever the
driver is taken into custody. At the deputy's discretion, a competent driver
may be located in cases where:
1.
There is excessive property in the vehicle, making a
complete
inventory cumbersome and time consuming;
2.

There are children involved;

2

There are two clerk's records which were submitted in separate volumes. However,
they were not assigned separate volume numbers. The brief will reference the 230page clerk's record as Volume I and the 77-page clerk's record as Volume II.
3

3.
Pets, valuable property or materials which need immediate
care, i.e. frozen foods, hazardous materials, etc., are in the
vehicle; or
4.
At the discretion of the deputy with regards to other
circumstances
at the scene.
Operations Bureau WILL NOT lock and park any vehicle then leave it
along side of the road or public parking area. Nor will personnel get into
the vehicle and then move it
Every time we allow a vehicle to sit at a location after an arrest, we incur a
measure of liability for any damage of theft. The same holds true when a
deputy moves or drives the vehicle themselves.
Beginning immediately, we will release only to those people who are
selected by the owner/operator, possess a valid driver's license, and have
been identified and included in the report. All other vehicles will be towed.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 (original emphasis).
In his suppression motion, Mr. McBride also argued that Officer Miller's search of
his vehicle was unreasonable because Kootenai County has no general policy setting
forth the requirements governing inventory searches and no specific policy governing
closed containers which are discovered during an inventory search. (R., Vol. II, pp.1124.) Thereafter, the district court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Denying
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. (R., Vol. I, pp.120-145.)
Mr. McBride then entered into a conditional plea agreement, which preserved his
ability to appeal the district court's order denying his suppression motion. (12/30/10
Tr., p.15, Ls.19-25; R., Vol. I, pp.215-216.) 3

Pursuant to the plea agreement,

Mr. McBride pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of driving under the influence and
a felony charge of possession of a controlled substance. (12/30.10 Tr., p.6, L.19- p.7,
L.8.)

In return, the State agreed to dismiss one count of possession of a controlled

4

substance and possession of paraphernalia, and the habitual offender enhancement.
(12/30/10 Tr., p.7, Ls.17-24.)

Thereafter, the district court entered its judgment of

conviction and imposed upon Mr. McBride a unified sentence of seven years, with five
years fixed, but retained its jurisdiction. (R., Vol. I., pp.221-223.) Mr. McBride timely
appealed. (03/17 /11 Notice of Appeal, pp.1-4.)4

3

Mr. McBride filed various pro se motions. (R., Vol., I, pp.148, 155-167, 195-200.)
However, the issues contained in those motions were not preserved in the conditional
~uilty plea. (R., Vol. I, pp.215-216.)
Mr. McBride subsequently filed various motions and amended notices of appeal.
However, Mr. McBride is not raising the issues related to those motions on direct
appeal.

5

ISSUE
Did the district court err in refusing to suppress evidence discovered through a
warrantless search of Mr. McBride's vehicle? 5

5

There were various issues addressed in the briefing in support of Mr. McBride's
suppression motion.
However, only the issue pertaining to tl1e validity of the
impoundment and subsequent search of his vehicle will be raised on appeal.
6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Refusing To Suppress Evidence Discovered Through A
Warrantless Search Of Mr. McBride's Vehicle

A.

Introduction
The district court denied Mr. McBride's suppression motion based on the

impoundment/inventory

search

exception

to

the

Fourth

Amendment's

warrant

requirement. On appeal, Mr. McBride argues that a police officer's decision to impound
and subsequently inventory the contents of a vehicle constitute two separate actions
which are both subject to scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment.

Mr. McBride

specifically argues that the State has failed to establish that Kootenai County's
impoundment policy is constitutional, in light of the fact it affords an arresting officer with
unfettered discretion to decide whether a vehicle will be impounded.
Mr. McBride also argues that the State failed to establish that the inventory
search of Mr. McBride's vehicle was constitutional because it never produced a
procedure which governs the process of creating an inventory in Kootenai County, and
a specific policy which controls the creation of an inventory in the context of closed
containers.

B.

Standard Of Review
The

question

of whether

the

district court

erred

in

finding

that the

impoundment/inventory search in this case comported with departmental policies and,
thus, was constitutionally permissible, turns on an interpretation of the applicable police
department policies (which are akin to statutes or, perhaps, contracts), and it is,
therefore, subject to de nova review. See State v. Skur/ock, 150 Idaho 404, 405 (2011)
("When this Court reviews a district court's order granting or denying a motion to
7

suppress evidence, the standard of review is bifurcated .... The Court will accept the
trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but may freely review the
trial court's application of constitutional principles in light of the facts found.").

'The

interpretation of a statute is a legal question over which this Court exercises free
review." State v. Howard, 150 Idaho 471, 476 (2011 ). "In determining the meaning of a
contract, '[w]hen the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous,' its meaning and
legal effect are questions of law over which we exercise free review." Wattenbarger v.
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 315 (2010).

C.

The State Failed To Meet Its Burden To Justify The Seizure Of Mr. McBride's
Vehicle Under Its lmpoundment Policy Because The Policy Provides An
Arresting Officer With An Unreasonable Amount of Discretion When Determining
Which Vehicles Will Be Impounded
Mr. McBride has a liberty interest against unreasonable seizures which is

protected by the Fourth Amendment of the United States' Constitution, which provides
that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."

Further,

Mr. McBride has a similar liberty interest under Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution.
See State v. Christensen, 131 Idaho 143, 146 (1998) ("Like the Fourth Amendment, the

purpose of Art. I, § 17 is to protect Idaho citizens' reasonable expectation of privacy
against arbitrary governmental intrusion.") "A seizure without a warrant is per se
unreasonable unless it falls within one of the limited exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment requirements." State v. Robertson, 134 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2000).
The "burden is on the government to show that a situation falls within one of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement."

State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218-219

( 1999) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971 )). It is the "State's
8

burden to prove through presentation of evidence that an exception to the warrant
requirement applied."

State v. Bower, 135 Idaho 554, 558 (Ct. App. 2001) (original

emphasis).
One well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is for so-called
impoundment/inventory searches.

See State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290-291

(1995). The initial decision to impound a vehicle is a seizure must be lawful and "is thus
subject to the limitations of the Fourth Amendment."

Id. at 291.

The Fourth

Amendment requires that "an impoundment must be reasonable under all the
circumstances known to the police when the decision to impound was made."

Id.

Further, it is reasonable to afford police officers "discretion in determining whether to
impound a vehicle, provided that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria
and on the basis of something other than suspicion of criminal activity." Id. (citing to
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987)). In Bertine, the United States Supreme

Court found appropriate, a standard set of police procedures which allowed an arresting
officer to decide whether to impound a vehicle based on the feasibility and
appropriateness of parking and locking a vehicle. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375-376. That
policy specifically required the establishment of:
[S]everal conditions ... before an officer may pursue the park-and-lock
alternative. For example, police may not park and lock the vehicle where
there is reasonable risk of damc1ge or vandalism to the vehicle or where
the approval of the arrestee cannot be obtained. Not only do such
conditions circumscribe the discretion of individual officers, but they also
protect the vehicle and its contents and minimize claims of property loss.
Id. at 375-376 n.7 (citation omitted).

In other words, if a policy allows an officer to

decide whether it will impound a vehicle, the officer's discretion must be limited by a set
of standards which promote policies such as protecting personal property and protecting
the police against false claims of property loss.
9

The purpose of this limitation is to

prevent an officer from using the impoundment as a means to circumvent the Fourth
Amendment.
Turing to the impoundment policy in this matter, Mr. McBride argues that it is
unconstitutional because it provides an arresting officer with an unreasonable amount of
discretion to decide whether to impound a vehicle. At the suppression hearing, the
State entered into evidence Kootenai County's Special Order #90A, which sets forth the
standard procedures which govern an officer's decision to impound a vehicle. (06/01/10
Tr., p.13, L.13 - p.14, L.1 O; Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.) The relevant portions of the procedure
follow:
It is the policy of the Operations Bureau to tow a vehicle whenever the driver is
taken into custody. At the deputy's discretion, a competent driver may be located
in cases where:
1.

There is excessive property in the vehicle, making a complete
inventory cumbersome and time consuming;

4.

At the discretion of the deputy with regards to other circumstances
at the scene.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.
The general Kootenai County policy requires the impoundment of all vehicles in
instances where the driver of a vehicle is arrested.

However, the problem with this

procedure arises in the exceptions to that rule because they allow an officer to forego
impoundment, based on the arresting officer's subjective belief that an inventory could
be burdensome or for "other circumstances at the scene." Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. The
former exception provides an arresting officer with unlimited discretion in deciding
whether to forego impoundment, which is based on the arresting officer's subjective
belief that performing an inventory could be burdensome.

In effect, this exception

swallows the general rule and affords an arresting officer an unreasonable amount of
10

discretion when deciding whether to impound a vehicle. The second exception is even
broader than the first, and allows an arresting officer to attempt to locate a competent
driver as an alternative to impoundment, at "discretion of the deputy with regards to
other circumstances at the scene."

Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.

The Kootenai County

impoundment policy does not define or otherwise limit what would constitute "other
circumstances."
These exceptions fall short of a standard set of criteria required under the United
States constitution.

In fact, this is the very type of unfettered discretion which is

prohibited under the Fourth Amendment because it enables arresting officers to make
ad hoc decisions to impound vehicles.

Weaver, at 291.

Due to this broad range of

discretion, and lack of predetermined criteria to temper that discretion, there is nothing
which prevents an officer's decision to impound from being based on the suspicion of
criminal activity.
Since Kootenai County's impoundment policy provided Officer IVliller with
unfettered discretion, there is no way to determine whether his decision to impound
Mr. McBride's vehicle was based on a community caretaker function or merely a ruse to
circumvent the warrant requirement.

In fact, Mr. McBride's mother spoke with Officer

Miller before he made the decision to impound the vehicle, and told him that she was
the owner of the vehicle, she did not want the vehicle towed, and she could pick it up in
one-half hour. (06/01/10 Tr., p.24, L.17 - p.26, L.10.) Officer Miller's intentions can be
placed into question because he asked Mr. McBride's mother if he could search the car

11

because he thought there were drugs in the vehicle. 6 (06/01/10 Tr., p.11, L.24- p.12,
L.5.)
In sum, the decision to impound Mr. McBride's vehicle constituted an illegal
seizure because the Kootenai County impoundment policy contains two exceptions
which provide an arresting officer an impermissible amount of discretion when deciding
whether to impound a vehicle. Due to that infirmity, the initial seizure of Mr. McBride's
vehicle was illegal and the subsequent search is imputed with the same taint and
therefore, must be suppressed. Weaver, 127, Idaho at 291. U.S. Const. amend IV.

D.

The State Failed To Meet Its Burden To Establish That The Search
Mr. McBride's Vehicle Was A Valid Inventory Search
The United States Constitution prohibits the government from engaging in

"unreasonable searches" of any person.

U.S. Const. amend IV.

It is now well-

established that '"searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate,"' i.e., warrantless searches, "'are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions."' Arizona v.Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1716 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)); accord State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290 (1995).

It is the government's burden to "demonstrate that the search fell within a wellrecognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the
circumstances.'' Weaver, 127 Idaho at 290.

6

Additionally, there is nothing in the record indicating that Officer Miller asked
Ms. Watson if she had a driver's license and if she wanted to drive the car prior to the
impoundment and subsequent inventory search. Further, Officer Miller never asked
Mr. McBride or his Mother if Ms. Watson could take possession of the car. These facts
or lack of facts, provide further support for the conclusion that Officer Miller's decision to
impound the car was merely a ruse to circumvent the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement.

12

One well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is for so-called
"inventory" searches.

See id.

In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-69

(1976), the United States Supreme Court approved of police departments' "community
caretaking function" of removing automobiles from streets and highways to improve the
flow of traffic and protect the public and held that, in certain circumstances, police can
inventory the contents of the vehicles they impound in order to: (a) protect the owner's
property from theft or vandalism, (b) immunize the police department from claims and
disputes arising out of stolen or damaged property, and (c) protect individual police
officers from dangerous items that may be inside impounded vehicles. Id. at 369, 372.
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the question of how an officer
may exercise his/her discretion when inventorying vehicles, in the specific context of a
locked container discovered within an impounded vehicle. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1,
2-3 (1990).

In that case, the Court noted that an officer "may be allowed sufficient

latitude to determine whether a particular container should or should not be opened in
light of the nature of the search and the characteristics of the container itself," but it
went on to hold that the search is impermissible in the absence of a policy specifically
addressing the opening of containers. Id. at 4-5.
In State v. Owen, 143 Idaho 274, 277 (Ct. App. 2006), the Idaho Court of
Appeals approvingly cited to Wells for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment
requires, "standardized criteria or established routine must specifically regulate the
opening if closed containers found during an inventory search."

The Court of Appeals

went on to quote the following from Wells:
Our view that standardized criteria ... or established routine ... must
regulate the opening of containers found during inventory searches is
based on the principle that an inventory search must not be a ruse for a
general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence. The policy
13

or practice governing inventory searches should be designed to produce
an inventory. The individual police officer must not be allowed so much
latitude that inventory searches are turned into a 'purposeful and general
means of discovering evidence of crime.'
Id. (quoting Wells 495 U.S. at 4 (quoting Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375)); see also State v.
Reimer, 127 Idaho 214, 219 (1995) ("To ensure that the purpose of an inventory search

is genuine, the government must show that any inventory search was conducted with
standardized criteria or established procedures."). In the event an inventory search is
performed in the absence of a departmental policy, the Fourth Amendment is not
satisfied and the remedy is suppression. Id.
In Owen, supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals was analyzing an unwritten inventory
policy. Id. 277-278. The only evidence pertaining to this policy, was the testimony of
two officers indicating that there was a general policy which required an inventory of
"everything that was taken into police custody." Id. There was conflicting testimony over
the existence of a policy which governed the opening of closed containers. Id. at 278.
The Idaho Court of Appeals held that this evidence did not establish the existence of a
standard policy which governed the process of inventorying closed containers in the
context. Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals ultimately held as follows:
Similar to Wells, the officers here had authority to conduct an inventory
search, but opened a locked container in the apparent absence of any
department policy or criteria, written or unwritten, regarding opening such
containers. Any suspicion the officers had that the safe contained
contraband did not alleviate the necessity for the sheriff's department to
either get a warrant or to establish, and its officers to follow, a
standardized criteria for dealing with locked containers pursuant to the
inventory search exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. Therefore, we hold that the opening of the safe was not
sufficiently regulated by department policy or standard criteria to satisfy
the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the district court erred in denying
Owen's motion to suppress evidence found in the safe.
Id. 278.

14

There is very little evidence in the record pertaining to a Kootenai County
inventory policy.

This evidence was elicited at the February 12, 2010, preliminary

hearing during the testimony of Officer Miller, 7 which follows:
Q.

. .. Do you have a copy of a written Kootenai County Sherriff's
Department Standard policy on an inventory?

A.

Not with me, no.

Q.

Do you know if one exists?

A.

There's a general order that states on uh, inventory searches of
vehicles, when you tow a vehicle.

Q.

Okay, and what's your understanding of what it says?

A.

Uh, once a party has been arrested from the vehicle that a full
inventory including locked compartments will be opened. Uh, all
substances inside will be identified and secured in a manner uh, for
the protection of the - - the driver of the vehicle and the officer on
the street and then the vehicle will be towed.

Q.

And that's the same in every arrest.

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Every arrest out of a vehicle gets an inventory search.

A.

Every arrest out of a vehicle. Um, there are exceptions to uh,
impounding vehicles, but any time that we impound a vehicle it gets
inventoried.

Q.

Okay. So what is your - - I - - And I guess maybe I asked the
wrong question. What is the policy of the Kootenai County Sheriff's
in regard to impounding vehicles?

7

There is reference to an inventory search in the Kootenai County's Special Order #90
A, where it states that an officer can forgo impoundment if there is "excessive property
in the vehicle, making a complete inventory cumbersome and time consuming."
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.) This does not qualify as an inventorying procedure. It is an
impoundment procedure which states that impoundment is not necessary if creating an
inventory will be cumbersome and time consuming. It does not provide any criteria
which governs that actual process of inventorying a vehicle, let alone a specific policy,
which governs closed containers.

15

A.

Uh, generally, if a registered owner is not on scene or is unable to
take control of the vehicle, then the vehicle is subsequently towed
uh, especially if it contains items that are uh, of a nature that could
be taken from the vehicle if it's left on the side of the road, that
could be stolen, that kind of thing, um, then the - - the [vehicle is]
inventoried and towed.

(02/12/10 Tr., p.39, L.19-p.41, L.2.)
It is not clear whether Officer Miller was discussing a separate inventory policy
and a separate impoundment policy, or if he was only, and inaccurately, describing the
Kootenai County impoundment policy Special Order #90 A. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.) At the
suppression hearing, Officer Miller was asked why he decided to perform an inventory
search, and Officer Miller provided various justifications for that decision, but none of
them were based on a standard inventory search policy. (06/01/10 Tr., p.11, Ls.1-18;
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.)

Concerning this point, Mr. McBride's trial counsel filed a

supplemental memorandum in support of the motion to suppress 8 and argued that
Officer Miller's preliminary testimony was only referring to the impoundment policy
Special Order #90 A, and that impoundment policy does not regulate the actual process
of inventory searches generally, and there is no specific policy controlling closed
containers. (R., Vol. II. pp. 20-23.) In response to this position, the State made no
argument, or otherwise attempt to establish whether Officer Miller was discussing
Special Order #90A or a separate inventory policy. (R., Vol. II. pp.41-42.)
The only argument made by the State was that Officer Miller's testimony
established that an inventory is taken after impoundment and that is a standard routine.
(R., Vol. 11., pp.41-42.) However, the district court found that the State's argument was

not responsive to Mr. McBride's, and, therefore, made an implicit factual finding that

8

This memorandum was filed after the June 1, 2010, suppression hearing. (R., Vol. II.,
pp.11-24.)
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there is no credible evidence supporting the existence a standardized policy governing
inventory searches in the context of closed containers. (R., Vol. I. 143-144.)
The State's failure to establish the existence of an inventory procedure at the trial
level is critical because the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the failure to present
such evidence at the trial level bars the introduction of that evidence on appeal.
Reimer, 127 Idaho at 218-219. The Supreme Court's specific language follows:
No evidence was introduced before the district court to establish that the
search was conducted in connection with any department policy and the
argument was not preserved for appeal. Thus, while it is certainly possible
that the State might have been able to assert the inventory exception
successfully as a justification for the warrantless search before the district
court, it did not do so.

Id.

Therefore, the State never met its burden by establishing the existence of a

Kootenai County policy that is designed to produce an inventory and will be barred from
doing so on appeal.
However, the district court overlooked that State's failure to produce such
evidence and its failure to address Mr. McBride's arguments when it denied
Mr. McBride's suppression motion on the basis that the containers in this matter were
not closed.

(R., Vol. I. pp.143-145.)

In coming to this conclusion, the district court

stated:
None of those cases [Wells, Owen, and Reimer] involve purse-type
containers of the type in the instant matter. Where the purpose of
inventorying contents is to protect property, protect the police against
claims or disputes over lost or stolen property, and protect police from
potential danger, the difference between safes, mugs, and locked
suitcases, on the one hand, and 'several purse type-bags' is great.
[Mr. McBride] does not allege the bags were locked or secured. And, the
contents of a safe, a mug bottom which is 'sealed snugly and only comes
off if pried with a strong with a strong finger nail or a flat object such as a
coin or screwdriver' or a locked suitcase do not pose the possible risk to
police that 'loose items of clothing, purses and handbags, larger bags, and
toiletries' may pose. Nor is the risk of claims or disputes regarding
missing or stolen items the same.
17

(R., Vol. I, pp.144-145 (citations omitted).)
The applicable case law does not support the distinction identified by the district
court.

While the cases mentioned by the district court happened to be dealing with

locked containers or containers which are difficult to open, none of the cases draw a
distinction between closed containers which are locked and unlocked. 9 These cases all
concluded that specific policies must be provided that govern inventory searches
generally, and even if there is a general policy, there must be a specific policy governing
closed containers.

Those cases do not hold that standard inventory policy is only

needed when confronted with a locked container. In fact, this is the very type of issue
preexisting procedures should address. For example, an appellate court in Florida held:
In so holding, we do not believe that the use of a lock on a closed
container is critical to the rationale of Wells. 10 Although the portion of the
Wells opinion that discussed the consent search recognized that the "act
of locking a container constitutes a manifest denial of consent to open it ..
. and creates a legally recognized zone of privacy inside that container,"
the portion of the opinion discussing inventory searches focused upon
closed-not locked-containers. Furthermore, Wells relied heavily on
Bertine, and in Bertine the backpack that was inventoried was closed, not
locked

Roberson v. State, 566 So.2d 561, 564 (Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted) (original
emphasis); see also Com. v. Muckle, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 678, 682 (Ct. App. 2004)
("More problematic, and fatal to the search conducted here, is the absence of standard

9

The containers at issue were not locked, but they were closed. At the preliminary
hearing, Officer Miller testified that "[a]s soon as I opened the ... purse, I recognized
that there were ... several syringes ... in the ... purse." (02/12/10 Tr., p.18, Ls.9-11
(emphasis added).) Officer Miller also testified that "the dog also had a zipper on the
back of it, and as I unzipped the - - the dog there [were] other syringes, miscellaneous
papers and things in the back of that." (02/12/10 Tr., p.18, Ls.11-14. (emphasis
added).) Officer Miller testified that he could not see any incriminating evidence until he
opened the items at issue. Therefore, the record indicates that the items at issue were
closed and Officer Miller opened them as part of the search.
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written procedures requiring the police to open closed but unlocked containers when
conducting an inventory search of an impounded vehicle.")

Since there is no policy

concerning the distinction between containers that are locked and containers that are
closed yet unlocked, Officer Miller was without any guidance and had total discretion to
decide to open the purse. Thus, there is no way of knowing if that decision was truly
based on a desire to create an accurate inventory or to search for evidence of a crime.
As argued above, the record contains evidence which indicates that Officer
Miller's decision to search the vehicle was based on his desire to search for evidence of
criminal activity. Officer Miller told Mr. McBride's mother that he wanted to search the
vehicle because he thought it might contain drugs.
L.5.)

(06/01/10 Tr., p.11, L.24 - p.12,

Therefore, there is evidence which indicates that the "inventory search" in this

matter was, in reality, an investigatory search.
In sum, Idaho Appellate Courts and the United State's Supreme Court both
require an otherwise reasonable inventory to be governed by a specific set of
preexisting standards to prevent an inventory search from turning into a ruse to avoid
the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.

The State never met its burden of

providing the district court with credible evidence establishing the existence of these
procedures. The district court made an implicit factual finding that those policies do not
exist, but nevertheless ruled against Mr. McBride based on a theory that the
requirement of standardized procedures is only applicable when police inventory the
contents of locked containers. That conclusion is not supported by case law and for
that reason the district court erred when it denied Mr. McBride's motion to suppress.

10

The Wells opInIon referenced in the preceding quote was the Florida Supreme
Court's opinion State v. Wells, 539 So.2d 464 (Fla.1989), which was affirmed by the
United States Supreme Court in Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. McBride requests that this Court vacate his
conviction and sentence, reverse the district court's order denying his suppression
motion, and remand that case for further proceedings.
DATED this 10th day of October, 2012.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

20

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of October, 2012, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
STEVEN DOUGLAS MCBRIDE
INMATE #99390
ICIO
381 W HOSP ITAL DRIVE
OROFINO ID 83707
JOHN T MITCHELL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010
Hand delivered to the Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court.

Administrative Assistant

SFW/eas

21

